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2 
DECOUPLING OF STANDARD IMPLEMENTATION  
FROM CERTIFICATION: 
DOES QUALITY OF ISO 14001 IMPLEMENTATION  





The literature on certifiable management standards has not paid sufficient attention to 
implementation of standard requirements in certified firms.  Firms that obtain standard certification 
to achieve the legitimacy benefits of certification may not implement standard requirements 
sufficiently to realize the standard’s intended performance outcomes.  We argue that such decoupling 
of implementation from certification threatens the effectiveness of certifiable standards as 
governance mechanisms for firms’ environmental conduct because standard certification may not 
accurately signal firms’ superior environmental performance to external stakeholders.  Empirical 
findings based on the ISO 14001 standard at the facility level support this view:  Quality of standard 
implementation affects facilities’ environmental performance, and environmental performance of 
certified and non-certified facilities does not differ significantly for the overall sample and low-
quality implementers, while high-quality implementers have better environmental performance than 
their non-certified counterparts.  We provide recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of 
governance systems for firm conduct based on certifiable standards. 
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International certifiable management standards such as the ISO 14001 Environmental 
Management System (EMS) are advocated as governance mechanisms for firms’ environmental 
conduct in light of concerns about the ability of national governments to regulate firm conduct in a 
globalizing world (Rappoport & Flaherty, 1992; United Nations, 1993).  These standards specify 
environmental management practices that are intended to reduce negative effects of firms’ operations 
on the natural environment (Terlaak, 2007).  Firms that implement the specified practices can obtain 
standard certification by passing an audit by independent third-party auditors.  Firms can use 
standard certification to signal their environmental responsibility to external stakeholders such as 
customers (King, Lenox, & Terlaak, 2005).   
Institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 
1983) suggests that firms may be more interested in obtaining the legitimacy and signaling benefits 
of standard certification than in fully implementing the practices prescribed by the standard in their 
operations.  Recent evidence confirms that despite third-party auditing some firms obtain standard 
certification without continuously complying with standard requirements and incorporating the 
prescribed practices in their daily activities (Boiral, 2003; Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Yeung & 
Mok, 2005) – a phenomenon known as decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  Such decoupling of 
certification from implementation raises concerns about the effectiveness of certifiable management 
standards as governance mechanisms because low quality of standard implementation may 
compromise the environmental performance benefits intended by the standard.   
Our study contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of certifiable standards as governance 
mechanisms for firms’ environmental conduct by theoretically exploring how quality of standard 
implementation affects certified firms’ environmental performance and whether standards are 
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accurate signals of environmental responsibility.  We empirically evaluate these issues in the context 
of the most widely adopted certifiable environmental standard – ISO 14001. 
Empirical studies of certifiable management standards have almost exclusively considered 
the act of certification rather than the implementation of the standards’ requirements in certified 
firms.  Studies have addressed questions such as what determines standard certification (Bansal & 
Bogner, 2002; Bansal & Hunter, 2003; Christmann & Taylor, 2001; Darnall, 2001, 2003) and 
whether environmental standard certification affects firms’ environmental performance (Andrews et 
al., 2003; King et al., 2005; Potoski & Prakash, 2005b).  By focusing only on certification these 
studies have implicitly assumed that certification is synonymous to implementation.  In this study, 
we explicitly consider how variations in the quality of implementation of certifiable management 
standards among certified firms affect their environmental performance.  We define a certified firm’s 
quality of standard implementation as the degree to which the firm adheres to standard requirements 
and embeds the activities prescribed by the standard in its daily routines.  Low quality implementers 
decouple standard implementation from certification by failing to continuously comply with the 
standard’s requirements and not using the prescribed activities in their daily operations, while high 
quality implementers consistently comply with the standard and embed the prescribed activities into 
their daily routines.   
While the third-party monitoring associated with certification reduces the likelihood that 
implementation is decoupled from certification, weaknesses in the auditing system such as lack of 
auditor qualification and auditor conflict of interest provide opportunities for firms to obtain standard 
certification without continuously adhering to the requirements of the standard (Boiral, 2003; 
Christmann & Taylor, 2006; O'Rourke, 2003).  We propose that decoupling standard implementation 
from certification limits the effectiveness of certifiable standards as a governance mechanism.   
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To provide a market based governance mechanism for firms’ environmental conduct in the 
global economy (Boiral, 2003; Cashore, 2002; Christmann & Taylor, 2001; Potoski & Prakash, 
2004; Rugman & Verbeke, 1998) international certifiable standards need to fulfill dual functions.  
First, certifiable standards need to be a tool for improving participating firms’ environmental 
performance.  They need to specify requirements that result in reductions of firms’ impact on the 
natural environment and provide monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms to assure that participating 
firms follow these requirements.  Second, certifiable standards need to accurately signal firms’ 
environmental responsibility to external stakeholders such as customers.  Certification provides 
information that is intended to allow customers to identify environmentally responsible suppliers at a 
low cost.  This enables customers to incorporate suppliers’ environmental responsibility as a criterion 
in their purchasing decisions and provides market incentives for suppliers to obtain standard 
certification to signal their environmental responsibility to customers who may prefer to do business 
with certified firms.  Thus, these standards are part of an emerging, mostly voluntary infrastructure, 
that pressures companies for greater responsibility, accountability, and transparency (Waddock, 
2008).   
Empirical findings raise concerns about the effectiveness of certifiable standards as a 
governance mechanism for firms’ environmental conduct.  Studies have found conflicting evidence 
on the relationship between firms’ certification to standards such as ISO 14001 and their 
environmental performance and have not found that certified firms experience better environmental 
performance than non-certified firms (Andrews et al., 2003; Darnall & Sides, 2008; King et al., 2005; 
Melnyk, Sroufe, & Calantone, 2003; Potoski & Prakash, 2005b).  These findings suggest that 
certifiable standards may not serve the two functions that they need to fulfill to be effective 
governance mechanisms.  The conflicting findings may be due to the fact that the literature has only 
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considered the act of certification and ignored how certified firms’ quality of standard 
implementation can influence their environmental performance.  If quality of ISO 14001 
implementation affects environmental performance, a relationship between certification and 
environmental performance may not exist.   
We argue that variance in quality of standard implementation across firms can compromise 
both of the functions that certifiable standards need to fulfill to serve as effective governance 
mechanisms for firm self-regulation.  First, we suggest that variance in the quality of standard 
implementation results in variations in environmental performance in certified firms.  Second, even if 
certified firms’ environmental performance is affected by their quality of standard implementation, 
standards may still serve their other function of signaling certified firms’ superior environmental 
performance if certified firms have better environmental performance than non-certified firms.  We 
suggest that the inter-firm variation in standard implementation may be sufficiently large to 
compromise the accuracy of standard certification as a signal of environmental responsibility.    
Our results based on a sample of 72 ISO 14001 certified and 72 matched non-certified 
facilities in the United States indicate that ISO 14001 implementation quality indeed affects certified 
facilities’ environmental performance.  We perform our empirical analysis at the facility level 
because ISO 14001 certification is commonly granted to facilities rather than to entire firms.  We 
further find that while on average certified facilities do not differ significantly in their environmental 
performance after certification from non-certified facilities, certified high-quality implementers have 
better post-certification environmental performance than their non-certified counterparts.  These 
results highlight the importance of quality of standard implementation and cast doubts on the 
effectiveness of governance systems based on certifiable management standards.  We discuss the 
implications of our findings for the design of enforcement mechanisms for certifiable standards, for 
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firms that use certifiable standards to signal their environmental responsibility, and for future 
research on certifiable standards. 
THE ISO 14001 ENVIRONMENAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
The ISO 14001 environmental management system standard was launched in 1996 by the 
International Organization for Standardization, the world’s largest standard setting organization 
with a membership of national standards institutes from 157 countries.  ISO 14001 requirements 
specify the elements of a generic environmental management system that can be used by firms of 
any size, in any industry, in any country to manage their environmental impacts.  ISO 14001 
certification is awarded by independent third-party auditors (also referred to as registrars) that 
need to be accredited by national ISO member bodies such as ANSI-ASQ in the United States.  
The generic character of the standard and the possibility to obtain certification in countries 
around the world have resulted in high adoption rates (Mendel, 2002).  With 188,815 certified 
facilities in 155 countries as of December 2008 (ISO, 2008), ISO 14001 is the most widely 
adopted environmental management standard in the world. 
Some firms adopt an environmental management system and choose not to obtain external 
certification to a particular standard.  Some of them follow the ISO 14001 requirements and self-
declare that their EMS meets ISO 14001 standard (Rondinelli & Vastag, 2000).  Such an in-house 
EMS lacks the external verification process to determine if the firm is properly implementing the 
system and such firms will not gain the signaling and legitimacy benefits associated with external 
certification to a standard such as ISO 14001 (Bansal & Hunter, 2003).  Therefore, many firms with 
an EMS take the extra step of certifying to ISO 14001. 
Like other international certifiable standards that seek to provide market-based governance 
mechanisms to regulate firm conduct in the global economy, the ISO 14001 standard is designed to 
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be a tool for improving firms’ environmental performance and to be a signal of firms’ environmental 
responsibility to external stakeholders.  In this section we will discuss these two functions of ISO 
14001 and their implications for the environmental performance of certified firms. 
ISO 14001 as a tool for improving environmental performance 
“The general purpose of [the ISO 14001] standard is to provide assistance to 
organizations that wish to implement or improve an environmental management system and 
thereby improve their environmental performance” (ISO, 2004).  The requirements established by 
ISO 14001 are based on rational and systematic management principles that the entire organization 
needs to subscribe to (Boiral, 2007).  The major steps that firms have to follow to obtain ISO 14001 
certification include the following (Bansal & Bogner, 2002).  First, firms have to review their 
activities and identify all their environmental impacts as well as applicable environmental 
regulations.  Second, they have to develop a plan to conform to environmental regulations, develop 
an environmental policy to which senior management is committed, and set specific environmental 
goals and targets to reduce their environmental impact.  Third, firms have to implement their 
environmental policy and work towards achieving their targets and goals by communicating the 
EMS to their employees, training and empowering them, and documenting relevant procedures.  
Fourth, firms have to perform periodic internal audits to identify their actual environmental impacts 
and address any nonconformance with their goals.  Fifth, firms have to periodically assess their EMS 
through a management review process and make necessary changes.  This regular review of their 
systems, structures, policies, and goals enables continual improvement.   
Firms’ adherence to the formal requirements of ISO 14001 is expected to lead to changes in 
their management of environmental issues that can result in improvements in their environmental 
performance.  The establishment of environmental policies and senior management commitment 
Copyright ©  Society for Business Ethics. This is a non-copyedited version of a paper forthcoming in Business Ethics Quarterly.  
It is available for personal scholarly use only. Any other use is subject to the same permissions terms as articles published in BEQ. 
 
9 
makes protecting the environment an organizational priority.  Requirements such as regularly 
tracking organizations’ environmental performance and progress towards the achievement of its 
environmental goals establish internal feedback mechanisms that contribute to environmental 
performance improvements.  Practices such as the identification of environmental aspects in work 
practices, development of training programs for employees and management, and documentation of 
environmental practices help to integrate environmental concerns into daily practice, raise 
management and employee awareness and involvement, and add more rigor to environmental 
programs (Jiang & Bansal, 2003).  Implementing the ISO 14001 EMS often fosters the adoption of 
additional environmental practices, such as substitution of polluting and hazardous materials, 
recycling systems, responsible disposal of waste and residues, and acquisition of clean technology 
(Gonzalez-Benito & Gonzalez-Benito, 2008; Sroufe, 2003).  ISO 14001 implementation can also 
contribute to better compliance with environmental regulations as the ISO 14001 EMS requires a 
systematic documentation and follow-up with applicable environmental regulations (Potoski & 
Prakash, 2005b).  
Studies have shown that external monitoring is essential for effective firm self-regulation 
through voluntary standards because in the absence of monitoring or sanctions poor environmental 
performers have incentives to free-ride by adopting the standard but not changing their behavior 
(Christmann & Taylor, 2006; King & Lenox, 2000).  ISO 14001’s third-party audit system provides 
a monitoring mechanism that is intended to ensure that certified firms comply with the ISO 14001 
requirements.  The third-party audit is intended to assess the extent to which firms comply with ISO 
requirements and to help spot opportunities for improvement (Jiang & Bansal, 2003).   
Both ISO 14001’s requirements and its third-party audit system are intended to ensure that 
certified firms are reducing the negative impact of their activities on the natural environment.  
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Several empirical studies have indeed shown a positive relationship between ISO 14001 certification 
and firms’ environmental performance (Melnyk et al., 2003; Potoski & Prakash, 2005a; Russo, 2001) 
or regulatory compliance (Kwon, Seo, & Seo, 2002; Potoski & Prakash, 2005b).  For example, ISO 
14001 certification was found to reduce wastes in production processes (Melnyk et al., 2003) and 
toxic emissions (Russo, 2001).  Potoski & Prakash (2005a) showed that certified facilities reduced 
pollution emissions more than non-certified facilities.   Furthermore, ISO 14001 certification was 
found to reduce the time facilities spend out of compliance with environmental regulations in the 
U.S. by about 7 percent (Potoski and Prakash, 2005b) and ISO 14001 certified facilities in Korea 
have less environmental violations than non-certified facilities. (Kwon et al., 2002).  
ISO 14001 as a signal to external stakeholders 
Institutional theory suggests that in order to survive, organizations must conform to 
institutional pressures from their external environment such as those from regulatory agencies, 
industry associations, non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders even if conforming to 
such pressures may have little to do with technical efficiencies (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987; 
Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Zucker, 1987).  Such conformance to institutional pressures provides 
enhanced legitimacy to these organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Meyer, Scott, & Deal, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Zucker, 1987).  Firms that adopt organizational 
practices for legitimacy reasons rather than for efficiency reasons often decouple implementation 
from adoption by not incorporating these practices in their daily activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
Decoupling enables organizations to enhance legitimacy in the eyes of external stakeholders while 
minimizing the uncertainties of incorporating the new practices on the existing technical activities of 
organizations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).   
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Firms have incentives and opportunity to decouple ISO 14001 implementation from 
certification.  Decoupling allows firms to gain the legitimacy and signaling benefits of ISO 14001 
certification without incurring the higher costs and potential organizational disruptions of high 
quality implementation.  Because firms obtain certification to standards such as ISO 14001 primarily 
to satisfy external institutional pressures from customers that require or prefer their suppliers to be 
certified (Christmann & Taylor, 2001; Gilbert & Rasche, 2007; Jiang & Bansal, 2003) many 
suppliers are more interested in obtaining certification to signal their environmental responsibility 
than in implementing the ISO 14001 EMS to achieve the intended environmental performance 
benefits.   
High quality implementation of ISO 14001 results in higher costs and greater organizational 
disruptions than low quality implementation.  High quality implementation requires considerable 
commitments of time and resources such as ongoing maintenance of the EMS and updating of its 
documentation, continuous training of employees and managers, and regular reviews and internal 
audits of environmental issues, all of which are costly (Delmas, 2002; Yeung & Mok, 2005).  
Indeed, many firms realize that more resources in terms of time, cost, and skills are required to 
develop and maintain the EMS than was initially expected (Balzarova & Castka, 2008).  
Furthermore, many managers believe that ISO certification adds more bureaucracy and constraints to 
their firms’ activities (Boiral, 2003; Boiral & Sala, 1998).  For example, some managers perceive that 
many administrative tasks required by the ISO system such as documentation contribute to decreased 
productivity and operating smoothness (Boiral, 2003).  Such perceptions lead to internal resistance to 
ISO implementation and thus will likely contribute to low quality implementation.  Thus, firms have 
incentives to symbolically implement the standard and pursue only the minimum quality of ISO 
14001 implementation necessary to pass the certification audit.   
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While the independent audits associated with ISO 14001 certification reduce the 
likelihood of decoupling certification from implementation, several weaknesses in the ISO 14001 
auditing system combined with the standard’s lack of specific performance requirements provide 
opportunity for firms that do not comply with ISO 14001 requirements to obtain certification.  
First, some auditors lack the business and technical knowledge of specific industries (O'Rourke, 
2002; Seddon, 1997; Swift, Humphrey, & Gor, 2000; Van Der Wiele & Brown, 1997; Yeung & 
Mok, 2005) that is required to discover non-conformances during the on-site audit.  This problem 
of auditor qualification is exacerbated by the fact that ISO 14001 prescribes design elements of 
an EMS that leave “significant room for … interpretation” (Nawrocka & Parker, 2009: 603) 
rather than setting specific performance targets.  Such process requirements complicate verification 
of compliance and increase the importance of auditor expertise as the criteria on which auditors 
base awarding certification cannot be objectively measured.  The fact that firms seeking 
certification play a vital role in the auditing process by providing documentation to external 
auditors increases concerns, because some firms take actions to provide the appearance to 
auditors that they use ISO standards in their daily operations when they actually do not (Boiral, 
2003; 2007).  Less qualified auditors may uncritically accept the internal report prepared by 
firms (Yeung & Mok, 2005).  The resulting differences in audit rigor allow firms to pass an audit 
carried out by one auditor while they would fail if a different auditor performed the audit (Boiral, 
2003; Yeung & Mok, 2005).  Thus, even if an audit concludes that a firm has properly 
implemented the EMS the substantive performance of the audited firm (in terms of how they 
implement the standard’s requirements) may be poor (Power, 1997: 60).    
Second, auditor independence is essential to assure unbiased certification, but ISO 14001 
auditors are selected and paid by the firms seeking certification.  Firms may be inclined to select 
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or continue business relationships with auditors who will provide the desired certification 
(Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, & Bazerman, 2006; Swift, et al., 2000).  This creates a potential conflict 
of interest for auditors, who may not fail undeserving companies because this would lead to a 
loss of clients (Moore et al., 2006; Seddon, 1997).   
Third, the ongoing nature of complying with ISO 14001 diverges from the periodic 
nature of certification and recertification.  Compliance with management system standards 
requires ongoing active utilization of the management system.  ISO 14001 certification and 
recertification audits are scheduled periodically at pre-announced dates.  These audits occur only 
every three years with less extensive pre-announced bi-annual or annual surveillance audits.  
Critics contend that auditing involves visits to factories that are too infrequent to evaluate normal 
day-to-day operations and the duration of the audit itself is too short to identify more than the 
most obvious problems, missing many important issues (Boiral, 2003; O'Rourke, 2002, 2003).   
These problems in the ISO auditing system raise a more fundamental question about 
ISO’s commitment to setting meaningful standards and assuring rigorous auditing of certified 
firms.1
                                                 
1 We would like to thank the editors and one of the reviewers for bringing this line of argument to our attention. 
  Critics of the ISO system contend that the stakeholders involved in the development 
process of ISO 14001 represent primarily the interests of industry, while key stakeholders 
representing the groups heavily impacted by the standard are excluded from the process 
(Balzarova & Castka, 2008; Gilbert & Rasche, 2007).  As the outcomes of the standard 
development process reflect the interests of the participating stakeholders it has been argued that 
the ISO 14001 standard reflects the interests of industry in an undemanding standard (Ecologia, 
2002) that may not be accompanied by rigorous auditing mechanisms.  Such an undemanding 
standard with lax auditing would allow firms to easily gain certification to signal their 
commitment to environmental responsibility to external stakeholders.   
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Studies have shown evidence of decoupling implementation from certification for the ISO 
14001 standard and for the similarly designed ISO 9001 quality management system standard.  
Boiral (2003) showed how ISO 9001 adoption resulted in ritual behavior for the purpose of 
demonstrating superficial conformity to the requirements of the standard particularly around the time 
of the certification audit.  Boiral (2007) found that ISO 14001 is mostly ceremonially adopted by 
firms, that is, certification to ISO 14001 is only loosely associated with firms’ actual practices.  
Others found variance in the implementation of ISO standards in facilities in the United States and 
China (Aravind & Christmann, 2007, 2008; Christmann & Taylor, 2006).   
Decoupling ISO 14001 implementation from certification will likely jeopardize the 
environmental performance benefits intended by the standard.  Certified firms that only symbolically 
implement ISO 14001 without using the prescribed practices in their daily operations may not make 
the changes in managing their environmental issues that are required to improve environmental 
performance.  Hence certification may not be an accurate signal of environmental responsibility for 
all certified firms.  Indeed, many empirical studies have found that ISO 14001 certification does not 
lead to superior environmental performance.  Studies have found that adoption of environmental 
management systems improves environmental performance, but that ISO 14001 certification does 
not add value beyond establishing an EMS (Andrews et al., 2003;  King et al., 2005).  A study 
found that ISO 14001 certified pulp and paper plants did not perform better than non-certified 
facilities (Barla, 2007).  A recent meta-analysis (Darnell and Sides, 2008) showed that empirical 
evidence on the environmental performance benefits of ISO 14001 certification is inconclusive.  This 
lack of a positive relationship between ISO 14001 certification and environmental performance is 
consistent with low-quality implementation of the ISO requirements in a large number of firms.  
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Examining how firms’ quality of ISO 14001 implementation rather than their certification affects 
their environmental performance can shed more light on the causes for these insignificant findings. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Our hypotheses address how the quality of ISO 14001 implementation in certified firms 
affects the two functions that certifiable standards need to fulfill to be effective governance 
mechanisms for firms’ environmental conduct in the global economy – improving firms’ 
environmental performance and providing an accurate signal of firms’ environmental 
responsibility to external stakeholders.  Our first hypothesis proposes a link between quality of 
ISO 14001 implementation and environmental performance in certified firms.  Our subsequent 
hypotheses test the accuracy of ISO 14001 as a signal of superior environmental performance by 
comparing the environmental performance of ISO 14001 certified and non-certified firms. 
The importance of standard implementation 
Not much is known about the relationship between quality of ISO 14001 implementation 
and firms’ environmental performance.  Barla’s (2007) finding that environmental performance 
differs widely among ISO 14001 certified pulp and paper plants is consistent with the argument that 
certified firms vary in their quality of standard implementation and that quality of 
implementation affects their environmental performance.  Only few empirical studies have 
explicitly considered variations in standard implementation among certified firms.  These studies 
have looked at the determinants of implementation quality (Christmann & Taylor, 2006) and the 
relationship between implementation quality and managers’ perceptions of benefits from 
standard adoption (Yin & Schmeidler, 2009).  Yin & Schmeidler (2009) find that managers in 
certified facilities with low quality of ISO 14001 implementation believe that ISO 14001 does 
not result in environmental performance benefits.  While this finding is consistent with the 
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argument that quality of implementation affects environmental performance it may also be due to 
a general negative perception of ISO 14001 by these managers.  A positive relationship between 
quality of practice implementation and realization of the practice’s intended performance 
benefits has been found in the context of another management practice – Total Quality 
Management (TQM)  (Ahire, Waller, & Golhar, 1996; Claver & Tari, 2003; Douglas & Judge, 
2001; Rao, Raghunathan, & Solis, 1999).   
ISO 14001’s requirements are intended to change firms’ management of environmental 
issues in ways that improve environmental performance.  Rondinelli & Vastag (2000) concluded 
that following the spirit of the ISO 14001 guidelines results in attitudinal, managerial and 
operational changes that provide environmental performance benefits through waste reduction 
and pollution prevention.  However, these improvements in environmental performance are 
contingent on the proper implementation and continuous use of the ISO 14001 practices.  A firm that 
implements ISO 14001 symbolically with minimal changes its daily operations is not likely to 
experience the performance benefits intended by ISO 14001.  Thus, we can expect that a firm’s 
quality of ISO 14001 implementation is positively related to its environmental performance. 
Hypothesis 1: The higher a firm’s quality of implementation of the ISO 14001 
requirements the better the firm’s post-certification environmental performance. 
Signaling accuracy of ISO 14001 
ISO 14001 can only be an effective governance mechanism for firm self-regulation, if 
ISO 14001 certification is an accurate signal of firms’ environmental responsibility, i.e. if ISO 
14001 certified firms are better environmental performers than non-certified firms.  Even if 
Hypothesis 1 is supported and implementation quality affects environmental performance certified 
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firms may still have better environmental performance than non-certified firms.  Our next set of 
hypotheses addresses this issue. 
The two functions of ISO 14001 provide conflicting predictions about the signaling accuracy 
of ISO 14001.  On the one hand, adopting ISO 14001 requires firms to implement an environmental 
management system that should improve their environmental performance. Thus, ISO 14001 
certified firms may have better environmental performance than non-certified firms that may not 
have such EMSs in place.  On the other hand, institutional theory suggests that ISO certified firms 
are primarily interested in the legitimacy and signaling benefits of ISO certification rather than its 
potential environmental performance benefits.  These firms will likely implement the standard 
symbolically and fail to integrate the ISO EMS in their daily operations, but do the minimum required 
to pass the certification audit. The failure to use the ISO EMS in daily operations suggests that 
differences in environmental performance between certified and non-certified firms may not exist.   
The signaling accuracy of ISO 14001 certification may additionally be compromised 
because some firms implement an EMS to manage their environmental impact without obtaining 
certification to the ISO 14001 standard (King et al., 2005).  Thus, some non-certified firms 
realize the environmental performance benefits of an EMS, which also reduces the 
environmental performance gap between certified and non-certified firms.   
This discussion leads to two competing hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a:  ISO 14001 certified firms have larger environmental performance 
improvements after certification than non-certified firms. 
Hypothesis 2b:  ISO 14001 certified and non-certified firms do not differ in their 
environmental performance improvements after certification. 
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The accuracy of ISO 14001 certification as a signal of environmental responsibility may 
hinge on firms’ quality of implementation.  Certified firms that pursue high quality implementation 
and use the ISO EMS in their daily operations may derive environmental performance benefits 
from EMS implementation  and thus, may exhibit superior environmental performance compared 
to their non-certified counterparts.  Certified firms that pursue low quality implementation may 
not gain the environmental performance benefits intended by the ISO 14001 EMS.  Therefore, 
these firms’ environmental performance may not differ from their non-certified counterparts. 
Hypothesis 3a: ISO 14001 certified firms with a high quality of implementation 
have larger environmental performance improvements after certification than 
non-certified firms. 
Hypothesis 3b: ISO 14001 certified firms with a low quality of implementation do not 
show a difference in environmental performance improvements after certification 
relative to non-certified firms. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
We tested our hypothesis using data from ISO 14001 certified facilities in the United States.  
We conducted our analysis at the facility level as ISO 14001 certification is mostly granted at the 
level of individual facilities such as plants.  Our sample is cross-sectional which provides variance in 
the motivations for certification, which we expect to result in differences in the quality of 
implementation across certified facilities.  For example, firms in the automotive industry face 
coercive pressures from their supply chain partners to obtain certification (King et al., 2005), which 
may make low quality implementation more likely, whereas in other industries such pressures may 
not exist possibly resulting in higher quality implementation.  The United States provides an ideal 
research setting for our study as facility level data on environmental emissions is available.  
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We obtained data from multiple sources.  Some of our measures are based on a mail 
questionnaire survey, since data on the implementation of ISO 14001 in facilities cannot be obtained 
from public sources.  We also used secondary data from sources such as the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency’s Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) database, the United States 
Census Bureau, and the Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) Million Dollar Database to either construct 
measures or triangulate survey-based measures. 
Sample and Data Collection 
This study is part of a larger research project on ISO 14001 implementation for which we 
collected data from ISO 14001 certified facilities in the United States.  We identified ISO 14001 
certified facilities from the Spring 2006 edition of QSU Publishing Company’s ISO 14001 
Worldwide Certified Company Directory (QSU, 2006), the most comprehensive database of certified 
facilities in the United States.  This directory contained information such as facility name, address, 
SIC code, date of certification, and name of the individual responsible for ISO 14001 for 5284 
facilities.  We restricted the mailing sample for our research project to 600 randomly selected 
facilities from the QSU directory to ensure that we were able to perform adequate follow-up to 
achieve a good response rate for our questionnaire survey. For this study on the relationship between 
ISO 14001 implementation and environmental performance we were only able to consider those 266 
of the 600 facilities that obtained initial certification between 1998 and 2002, because for facilities 
that were certified outside of this timeframe we were not able to obtain environmental performance 
data for three years before and three years after their initial certification from the TRI database.2
                                                 
2 We had usable TRI data for the years 1995 to 2005.  2005 was the last year for which TRI data was available at the 
time of analysis. We chose 1995 as our earliest year because in this year a large number of chemicals were added to 
the list of chemicals for which facilities must report their releases to the TRI.  Therefore, the information on TRI 
releases for years prior to 1995 is not comparable with TRI release information from 1995 onward. 
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 The target respondent for our survey was the individual at the facility who is responsible for 
ISO 14001.  We initially identified this individual from the QSU database (where it was available) 
and made phone calls to each facility in our mailing sample to confirm the identity of this individual 
and to obtain the name of the person for those facilities where the listed individual was no longer 
in charge or that did not have a name listed in the database.  Our respondents were mostly facility-
level Environmental, Health, and Safety (EHS) Managers or Quality Managers.  The average 
management experience of our respondents is 14.9 years.  Like other studies on ISO standards (e.g., 
Boiral & Roy, 2007; Gonzalez-Benito & Gonzalez-Benito, 2008; Melnyk et al., 2003) we used a 
single-informant approach. Such an approach is likely to result in reliable and valid data if the 
informant is carefully chosen (Campbell, 1955; John & Reve, 1982).  Our chosen target respondent – 
the person in charge of ISO 14001 – is likely to be the most knowledgeable individual at each facility 
and thus is the most appropriate person to complete our questionnaire.   
We developed our questionnaire based on existing literature on certifiable management 
standards, implementation of such standards, and environmental performance (e.g., Christmann & 
Taylor, 2006; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006; Klassen & Whybark, 1999; Naveh & Marcus, 2005; Naveh 
& Marcus, 2004) and incorporated feedback from managers obtained in interviews and pre-tests.  We 
discussed the initial version of our questionnaire during personal interviews with four facility 
environmental and/or quality managers in the U.S. who were responsible for the ISO 14001 system 
at their facility.  These managers also provided us with extensive written feedback on the survey 
questions.  After making changes based on their suggestions we conducted a pilot study with a 
shortened version of the questionnaire containing our key measures with managers who attended a 
regional meeting of the American Society for Quality in September 2006.  Based on their feedback 
and results from this pilot study, we designed the final version of the survey. 
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We based our survey administration on the tailored design method which has been shown to 
improve response rates to mail surveys (Dillman, 2000).  We conducted the first mailing of our 
survey in October 2006, and performed two follow-up mailings in December 2006 and January 
2007.  Of the 600 mailed surveys 13 were undeliverable due to incorrect addresses, and of the 
remaining 587 surveys 199 were returned completed yielding a response rate of about 34 percent. 
For those 266 facilities that were certified between 1998 and 2002 we achieved a slightly higher 
response rate of about 38 percent (101 completed surveys were returned).   These response rates 
compare favorably with other studies on ISO standards that achieved response rates of 10.35 percent 
(Melnyk et al., 2003) and 31.4 percent (Boiral and Roy, 2007).  Of the 101 facilities certified 
between 1998 and 2002 that returned surveys, 72 had three years of pre-and post-certification TRI 
data available and could be included in our empirical analysis.  The mean size of our respondent 
facilities was 545 employees with the number of employees ranging from 25 to 2700.   
 To test hypotheses 2 and 3 which require comparing the environmental performance of ISO 
14001 certified and non-certified facilities, we constructed a sample of 72 non-certified facilities that 
were matched as closely as possible to the 72 certified facilities in our sample in terms of industry 
membership, location, and facility size.  For each of the 72 certified facilities we used the NAICS 
(North American Industry Classification System) Code and location information in the TRI database 
to identify potential matched facilities that were in the same industry and located as close as possible.  
We matched facilities by location based on the state in which facilities were located and further set a 
criterion that each matched facility should not be more than 150 miles from the corresponding 
certified facility.  Then we used the QSU database to eliminate those potential matches that were ISO 
14001 certified.  We further compared the size of each certified facility in our sample (measured as 
the number of employees) to the closest non-certified facility in the same industry.  We obtained size 
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information for the non-certified facilities from secondary databases including Hoover’s and Manta.  
If a large size discrepancy between a certified facility and its closest matched non-certified facility 
existed, we compared the size of the next closest non-certified facility until we found a facility of 
similar size.  Using industry membership as a matching criterion allows us to control for factors that 
affect the environmental performance of all facilities in an industry such as technological advances, 
changes in federal government regulations, or other stakeholder pressures.  Using location as a 
matching criterion controls for factors that affect the environmental performance of all facilities 
located in the same region such as regional (state level) environmental regulations.  Using facility 
size as a matching criterion allows us to control for any differences in environmental performance as 
a result of possible economies of scale in the management of environmental issues. 
Assuring data quality 
We took several steps to assure the quality of our survey data and to minimize common 
methodological problems of using survey data such as common method variance (Campbell & Fiske, 
1959; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003).  First, we adopted measures to reduce social 
desirability bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003), which should increase truthfulness of responses.  We 
guaranteed anonymity to respondents and reduced evaluation apprehension by assuring respondents 
that there are no right or wrong answers.  We also aimed to develop survey items that are factual 
rather than perceptual and that are based on objective behavior rather than on subjective attitudes.  
For example we asked respondents whether they use ISO documents in daily practice rather than 
asking them how useful they perceive these documents to be.  Second, to avoid respondents 
misunderstanding the survey questions we avoided vague concepts, kept questions simple and 
precise, and decomposed questions with more than one possible interpretation to simpler, more 
focused questions.  Third, we avoided problems of common method bias (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; 
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Podsakoff et al., 2003), that are frequent in survey research that relies on collecting independent and 
dependent variables from the same respondent at the same time, by using survey data only for our 
independent variables and using the TRI database to construct our dependent variables.  In addition, 
we used secondary sources to obtain or triangulate some of our control variables.   
Representativeness of Respondents 
We performed three tests to ensure that our ISO 14001 certified respondents were 
representative of our mailing sample.  First, a comparison of respondents to non-respondents showed 
that these two groups of facilities do not significantly differ in terms of facility size (number of 
employees) and that our respondents are representative of our mailing sample in terms of industry 
membership and location.  We found no differences in response rates across two-digit SIC industries 
and states in which facilities are located.  Second, a wave analysis showed that a self-selection bias, 
which makes facilities with certain characteristics more likely to respond to our survey, is unlikely to 
exist.  Wave analysis assumes that non-respondents are more similar to late respondents than to early 
respondents (Fowler, 1993).  A comparison of responses to our first mailing and to our third mailing 
revealed no significant differences in the levels of the variables included in our study or in the 
relationships among these variables. Third, respondents are representative of our mailing sample in 
terms of environmental performance.   A t-test indicated that respondents and a sample of non-
respondents did not significantly differ in terms of their change in toxic releases after certification 
(based on three year average annual releases before and after ISO 14001 certification from the TRI 
database).  
Measures   
The appendix lists definitions and data sources for our measures.  For multi-items measures 
we show Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients in the diagonal of the correlation matrix in Table 1. 
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Independent variable. We measured quality of implementation of the ISO 14001 on a 
continuum, ranging from low to high quality of implementation.  We based our measure on items 
used in previous studies (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Naveh & Marcus, 2005; Naveh & Marcus, 
2004).  Since implementation of ISO 14001 requires many different activities, our measure consists 
of five survey items relating to different aspects of ISO 14001 implementation (e.g., use of ISO 
14001 documents in daily practice, taking corrective actions, preparation for the audit).  Please see 
the Appendix for a complete list of the items included in this measure.  While each of these items 
captures a different activity associated with ISO 14001 implementation, all these activities are 
interrelated as part of the EMS.  Therefore, we expect that a facility’s quality of implementation will 
be consistent for all these activities, e.g. facilities will not take corrective actions based on ISO 14001 
audit findings if the EMS is not part of their regular routine.  An exploratory factor analysis with 
varimax rotation yielded one factor that all the five items loaded on, which indicates that quality of 
implementation is a unidimensional construct.  The Cronbach Alpha of 0.81 exceeds the 
recommended cutoff of 0.7 (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994), indicating internal consistency of the 
items.  Our measure is the average of the five survey items.  A low score indicates low quality of 
implementation and a high score indicates high quality of implementation.   
Dependent variable. Environmental performance can be operationalized by different 
measures, such as environmental reputation, compliance with environmental regulations, and 
emissions.  For this study we needed to select an environmental performance measure that is likely to 
be directly affected by ISO 14001 implementation and for which data is available at the facility level.  
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As a facility’s quality of ISO 14001 implementation is not transparent to outsiders it is not likely to 
affect environmental reputation.  Measures of compliance with environmental regulations such as 
fines are episodic (Russo, 2001) and do not therefore reflect the continuous nature of the relationship 
between EMS implementation and firms’ environmental performance.  Compliance measures also 
depend on enforcement that may be uneven across states and industries contributing to noise.  To 
overcome the limitations of these measures we operationalized environmental performance using 
toxic emissions at the facility-level from the TRI database (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006; Klassen & 
Whybark, 1999), which is commonly used in academic research.  The TRI database is a publicly 
available database compiled by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). It contains 
information on the quantity of toxic chemical releases for approximately 650 chemicals.  Facilities in 
the U.S. that employ ten or more full-time equivalent employees and that manufacture, process or 
otherwise use at least one of these toxic chemicals in excess of the threshold quantity are required to 
report their releases (EPA, 2006).   
From the TRI database we obtained total chemical release information (both on-site and off-
site emissions) for all reporting facilities for each year from 1995 to 2005.  Because a few additional 
chemicals were added to the TRI  after 1995, we based our calculations for all years only on the 1995 
list of core chemicals (i.e. all chemicals for which release data was included in the TRI database in 
the year 1995), which makes release information comparable across years.   
The dependent variable employed in our test of Hypothesis 1 is post-certification 
environmental performance measured as the logarithm of reverse-scored average annual total TRI 
releases for each certified facility in the three years after obtaining initial certification.  Using three-
year average releases smoothes out the effects of one-time events such as accidental spills.  The 
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measure was reverse-scored because lower releases mean better environmental performance and 
using logarithms of the TRI releases reduces the effects of extreme observations. 
To test hypotheses 2 and 3 about the differences in improvement of environmental 
performance between certified and non-certified facilities we measured the improvement in post-
certification environmental performance relative to pre-certification environmental performance 
calculated as the percentage reduction in three-year average annual total TRI releases after 
certification.  Positive numbers indicate reductions in TRI emissions, i.e. improvements in 
environmental performance, while negative numbers indicate increases in emission, i.e. decreases in 
environmental performance.  For each of the non-certified matched facilities we based our 
calculations on the same calendar years that we used to construct the measure for the corresponding 
ISO 14001 certified facility.  This allowed us to control for exogenous factors that affect the 
environmental performance of all firms’ in an industry in a given year such as changes in 
environmental regulations or technological advances. To reduce the effect of outliers, we 
winsorized this variable (Barnett & Lewis, 1994; McNamara, Haleblian, & Dykes, 2008) at the 98th 
percentile.  However, our results do not change substantially when unwinsorized data is used.  
Control variables. We included  a variety of control variables that likely affect environmental 
performance independent of the quality of ISO 14001 implementation in our tests of hypothesis 1.  
Environmental performance in years prior to initial certification is likely to be a major determinant of 
environmental performance after certification.  We included the logarithm of reverse-scored average 
annual total TRI releases for each facility in the three years prior to obtaining certification in our 
model to control for this effect.  Large facilities can employ scale-intensive abatement technologies 
and may benefit from economies of scale in emission reduction.  Therefore, we controlled for facility 
size by using the logarithm of the number of employees as reported in our survey.  A triangulation of 
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this measure with employee data from the D&B Million Dollar Database showed a high and 
significant correlation between the two variables (0.61, p < 0.01) increasing our confidence in the 
survey-based measure.  Older facilities likely use older equipment and technologies, which may 
negatively affect environmental performance. Hence we controlled for facility age by using the 
square root of the facility’s age in years as reported in our survey.  Facilities in industries with a high 
rate of technological change are more likely to change their equipment frequently.  These facilities 
are more likely to use the latest environmental technologies in production, which can be expected to 
reduce emissions. We controlled for the rate of technological change in the industry by using a two-
item measure based on survey responses.  Community pressures can affect facilities’ management of 
their environmental activities (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006) which in turn can affect the environmental 
performance of facilities.  Following Kassinis and Vafeas (2006), we used community population 
density measured as the logarithm of the number of inhabitants per square mile in the county in 
which the facility was located in the year 2000 obtained from U.S. Census Bureau’s database to 
control for community pressures.  
Analytical Method and Preliminary Data Analysis 
 We used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis to test Hypothesis 1.  We verified 
that all variables included in this analysis conformed to the distributional assumptions of OLS 
regression.  For the variables that were not normally distributed (pre- and post-certification 
environmental performance) we performed log-transformations to have their distributions 
approximate normal distributions.  Before performing the regression analysis, we evaluated the 
likely extent of multicollinearity in our data.  Low correlations among our independent variables (see 
Table 1) and small variable inflations factors (VIF) – our largest VIF of 1.13 is well below the 
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recommended cutoff of 10 (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980) – both suggest that multicollinearity is 
not a problem in our data. 
To test hypotheses 2 and 3 about the differences in environmental performance improvement 
between certified and non-certified facilities, we used parametric, independent sample, one-tailed t-
tests.  While a Shapiro-Wilk test indicated that our environmental performance variable is not 
normally distributed, our sample size is relatively large (greater than 25) and the sample sizes for our 
groups of certified and non-certified facilities are equal which suggests that parametric tests are 
appropriate (Gaither & Glorfeld, 1985).  Levene’s test for equality of variance indicated that equal 
variances for the two sub-samples of certified and non-certified facilities cannot be assumed.  
Consequently, we report results of t-tests that do not assume equality of variances.  Results of t-tests 
that assumed equality of variances were consistent with the unequal variance results we report.   
To test hypotheses 2a and 2b, we performed t-tests for the full sample (comparing all 
certified facilities to all matched non-certified facilities).  To test hypotheses 3a and 3b, we 
divided our sample of 72 ISO certified facilities into two equal sized sub-samples of 36 high-
quality (top) and 36 low-quality (bottom) implementers based on their quality of ISO 14001 
implementation scores.  We assigned each non-certified facility to one of two corresponding 
non-certified sub-samples depending on the assignment of its corresponding certified facility.  
We performed separate t-tests for the sub-samples of top and bottom ISO 14001 implementers, 
i.e. comparing the environmental performance improvement for the 36 facilities in each of our 
two certified sub-samples to that of the 36 facilities in their corresponding sub-sample of 
matched non-certified facilities.  Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample and 
the top and bottom implementer sub-samples.  Figure 1 provides a visual depiction of our data. 
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Table 2 shows the regression results for testing hypothesis 1. Model 1 includes control 
variables only.  In model 2, we added the independent variable quality of ISO 14001 implementation.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 Hypothesis 1 suggests that higher quality ISO 14001 implementation leads to better post-
certification environmental performance.  This hypothesis is supported by the data.  The coefficient 
for quality of implementation in model 2 is positive and significant (p < 0.001) and including 
quality of implementation significantly improves the explanatory power of the model (p < 0.001).  
Table 4 shows the t-test results for the differences in post-certification environmental 
performance improvement between ISO 14001 certified and matched non-certified facilities for our 
tests of hypotheses 2 and 3.  Hypothesis 2a suggests that ISO 14001 certified firms have higher 
environmental performance improvements after certification than non-certified firms while 
hypothesis 2b suggests that such differences do not exist.  We find that for the full sample both 
certified facilities and their non-certified counterparts show decreases in environmental performance 
after certification (Table 3).  While the decrease in environmental performance is smaller for the 
certified facilities than for the non-certified facilities (i.e. the certified facilities have better 
environmental performance), our t-test indicates that this difference is not significant (Table 4).  This 
result lends support to hypothesis 2b.   
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
           -------------------------------------- 
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Insert Table 4 about here 
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Hypothesis 3a suggests that after certification ISO 14001 certified firms that pursue high 
quality implementation have higher environmental performance improvements than non-certified 
firms.  This hypothesis is supported.  Results indicate that for the top implementer sub-sample, the 
difference in environmental performance improvement between certified facilities and non-certified 
facilities is significant (p < 0.05).  An examination of the means for the sub-sample (Table 3) 
indicates that top implementers experience environmental performance improvements whereas their 
non-certified counterparts see environmental performance decreases.   
 Hypothesis 3b suggests that after certification ISO 14001 certified firms that pursue low 
quality implementation will not differ in environmental performance improvements from non-
certified firms.  This hypothesis is supported.  For the bottom implementer sub-sample, the 
difference in environmental performance improvement between certified facilities and non-certified 
facilities is not significant.    
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this study we examined how the variance in the implementation of certifiable 
environmental standards among certified firms affects the two functions that certifiable standards 
need to fulfill to be effective mechanisms for governing firms’ environmental conduct in the global 
economy – improvement of firms’ environmental performance and signaling firms’ environmental 
responsibility to customers and other external stakeholders.  Using the ISO 14001 environmental 
management system standard as the research setting, our results show that quality of standard 
implementation in certified facilities affects the realization of the environmental performance benefits 
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intended by the standard.  The higher a certified facility’s quality of implementation of the ISO 
14001 EMS, the lower are its toxic emissions after certification.  Our results also show that the inter-
firm variance in standard implementation affects the accuracy of standards as a signal of firms’ 
environmental responsibility.  Comparing post-certification changes in emissions of ISO 14001 
certified facilities with changes in emissions for a matched sample of non-ISO 14001 certified 
facilities for the same calendar years, we find that these two groups do not differ significantly in their 
environmental performance.  When analyzing the differences between certified and non-certified 
facilities for sub-samples of top and bottom quality implementers we find that certified top (high 
quality) implementers have superior environmental performance compared to their non-certified 
counterparts, while we find no significant difference in the environmental performance between 
certified bottom (low quality) implementers and their non-certified counterparts.   
Implications for the use of certifiable standards as governance mechanism 
These results raise troubling concerns for the effectiveness of governance systems for firms’ 
conduct based on certifiable standards.  Firms’ variance in the implementation of ISO 14001, the 
most widely adopted voluntary environmental standard, compromises the performance benefits 
intended by the standard to such an extent that firms’ standard certification does not allow customers 
and other stakeholders to correctly identify environmentally responsible firms.  Overall, certified 
firms do not show significantly higher environmental performance than non-certified firms.  Whether 
ISO certification is an accurate signal for firms’ environmental responsibility hinges on firms’ quality 
of implementation of the ISO 14001 EMS.  Firms’ quality of implementation of the ISO 14001 EMS 
is not observable by outsiders (King et al., 2005), so that customers and other stakeholders have no 
way of telling which certified firms are high quality and which are low quality implementers.  Thus, 
customers and other stakeholders can only use ISO 14001 certification as an indication that a firm 
Copyright ©  Society for Business Ethics. This is a non-copyedited version of a paper forthcoming in Business Ethics Quarterly.  
It is available for personal scholarly use only. Any other use is subject to the same permissions terms as articles published in BEQ. 
 
32 
may have superior environmental performance, but they will not be able to tell for which certified 
firms this is actually the case.   
Thus our findings pose a serious threat to the credibility of the ISO 14001 certification 
system.  Without proper implementation the system reduces to a meaningless label that is intended to 
enhance firm legitimacy in the eyes of external stakeholders.  Once those stakeholders become aware 
that the inter-firm variance in implementation quality threatens the accuracy of ISO certification as a 
signal of superior environmental conduct, the credibility and legitimacy of the system of ISO 14001 
certification may be jeopardized.  When stakeholders realize that certification does not allow them to 
differentiate between high and low environmental performers they will cease rewarding firms that 
are certified (Terlaak, 2007), thus reducing incentives for firms to obtain certification.  For example, 
the loss of standard credibility may result in customers ceasing to make ISO 14001 a criterion in their 
supplier selection.  As a result suppliers may cease to see any reasons for obtaining ISO 14001 
certification, which would result in lower numbers of certified firms. 
Increasing the effectiveness of certifiable standards as governance mechanisms 
We do not mean to suggest that it is impossible for ISO 14001 to be an effective governance 
mechanism for firm self-regulation.  Indeed, we find that firms with high quality of ISO 14001 
implementation had superior environmental performance than non-certified firms.  Thus ISO 14001 
can be an effective tool for self-regulation if firms implement it properly.  This suggests that 
governance systems for firm self-regulation based on certifiable standards need to put more effective 
enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure compliance with standard requirements in certified firms 
(Christmann & Taylor, 2006).  The effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms can be increased by 
making changes in the audit system itself and by making auditors more accountable for their work.  
Changes in the audit system could include unannounced surprise audits to verify that certified firms 
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are using the practices prescribed by the standard in their daily operations and are not receiving and 
maintaining certification by making last-minute audit preparations.  In addition, putting time limits 
on the relationships between auditors and their clients would alleviate some of the concerns about 
conflicts of interests that currently exist in the auditor-client relationship in which auditors may not 
want to be too stringent out of fear of losing clients.  The accountability of auditors for their work 
could be increased by surprise spot-checks of a few certified firms by other auditors.  These surprise 
spot-checks could be initiated by the national accreditation agencies that accredit auditors to certify 
the standard.   
The findings of our study point to one important change in the ISO 14001 audit system that 
could enhance its effectiveness, an increase in the transparency of audit findings to the public.  While 
the auditor provides the client a complete record of the audit, there is no public record of audit results 
and certification failures (Stenzel, 2000).  Increasing the transparency of audit findings to the public 
could increase the accuracy of standard certification as a signal of responsible environmental conduct 
by allowing customers and other stakeholders to obtain more information about certified firms’ 
quality of ISO 14001 implementation.  For example, a rating system that provides more information 
about the quality of implementation in certified firms could be instituted.  Similar to the Leadership 
in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) Green Building Rating System that provides standards 
for environmentally sustainable construction, ISO could institute a point system in which firms’ level 
of certification (e.g. Platinum, Gold, Silver, etc.) depends on the number of points obtained during an 
audit.  The number of points could be tied to the certified firm’s quality of ISO 14001 
implementation.  Information about audit failures may also provide important clues about a certified 
firms’ quality of ISO 14001 implementation to external stakeholders.  It is estimated that in the 
United States 30 to 35 percent of facilities fail at their first audit to the ISO 9001 quality management 
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system standard (Nichols, 1993), which is similar in the design and the nature of requirements to the 
ISO 14001 standards, but that most firms seeking certification eventually attain it.  Firms that 
repeatedly fail their certification audits likely have a lower quality of implementation of their ISO 
14001 EMS. 
The finding that the ISO 14001 standard is not effective in maintaining a consistent quality of 
implementation suggests that the standard has not so far been capable of establishing a normative 
base for firms’ environmental conduct. This finding seems to corroborate an early realization that 
normative behavior cannot be produced through self-interests and market incentives but through 
intrinsic environmental values (Hoffman, 1991).  While such intrinsic ecological values foster a more 
holistic approach to ecological responsiveness only very few firms possess such values (Bansal & 
Roth, 2000).  Scholars have expressed hope that firms may internalize certifiable management 
practices such that compliance is driven by intrinsic values rather than by external sanctions and the 
potential for internal benefits (Terlaak, 2007).  However, given that such intrinsic ecological values 
are currently relatively rare, standard monitoring and enforcement may become even more important 
to assure that certified firms comply with standard requirements. 
Implications for research 
Our findings also have important implications for research on certifiable standards by 
highlighting the importance of considering firms’ quality of implementation of certifiable 
management standards after their certification by independent auditors.  Most prior studies have used 
standard certification as a proxy for the implementation of the practices certified by the standard 
without considering implementation quality (e.g., Darnall & Sides, 2008; Potoski & Prakash, 2005a; 
Russo, 2001).  Our findings suggest that inter-firm variance in standard implementation quality can 
explain conflicting findings in prior empirical research.  The mixed empirical evidence on the 
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relationship between standard certification and environmental performance may be due to the failure 
to take into account firms’ implementation quality.   
Further research could explore the antecedents of firms’ quality of implementation of 
certifiable standards.  Our findings indicate that some certified firms behave as predicted by 
institutional theory by mainly focusing on certification to the standard without changing their internal 
processes to the extent required to achieve the intended environmental performance benefits of 
standard implementation.  Other firms behave as predicted by the view that standards provide 
rational and systematic management practices that result in performance improvement in certified 
firms.  We do not know which factors prompt firms to behave in these different ways.  Factors that 
may affect firms’ quality of implementation include external factors such as the extent of institutional 
pressures for certification that they face as well as internal factors such as their motivation for 
certification or the resources and capabilities that firms possess to implement the standard. 
While our study is the first to show a relationship between quality of standard 
implementation and environmental performance, we are not the first to suggest that ISO auditing 
may not ensure compliance with ISO standards.  It may be a fruitful area for further research to 
investigate why ISO has not yet made efforts to improve its system of external audits.  Future 
research could explore whether ISO is really committed to improving environmental performance as 
stated in their documents or whether an alternative institutional explanation for their behavior exists.   
Limitations and conclusion 
Our study is not without limitations.  First, we test our hypotheses in the context of a single 
management standard, the ISO 14001 EMS standard.  However, we believe that the general lessons 
of our study apply to other standards as well, especially when these standards become a requirement 
for firms to do business, so that firms adopt these standards not because of intrinsic motivations, but 
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because of coercive pressures.  Furthermore, many international standards for firms’ social and 
environmental conduct such as the United Nations’ Global Compact or the International Chamber of 
Commerce’s Business Charter for Sustainable Development are not externally audited.  For these 
standards the issue of symbolic adoption may be even more widespread as they lack an enforcement 
system to assure firm compliance.  Second, implementation should ideally be studied over a period 
of time (Klein & Sorra, 1996).  It would be interesting to investigate whether and to what extent the 
quality of implementation changes over time at a given facility.  Unfortunately, longitudinal data that 
might allow us to examine these issues is difficult and time consuming to obtain for a large sample of 
firms, but this may be a worthwhile endeavor for future research.  Third, our study uses data from a 
single country – the United States.  However, we do not see any reason to believe that the 
relationship between the quality of ISO implementation and environmental performance we 
uncovered in our study is unique to the U.S.  What may however differ in other countries is the 
quality of ISO audits.  In particular, concerns have been voiced about the variance in audit stringency 
among auditors in emerging economies such as China (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Yeung & Mok, 
2005).  Thus, in other countries variations in firms’ quality of ISO 14001 implementation may be 
even larger, which is likely to exacerbate threats to the effectiveness of using certifiable standards as 
a governance mechanism for firms’ conduct uncovered in our study.   
Despite these limitations our study makes an important contribution to the literature on 
certifiable standards by highlighting the importance of a variable that has previously not received 
sufficient attention – the quality of standard implementation.  We empirically show that facilities’ 
low quality of standard implementation compromises both functions that certifiable standards need to 
fulfill to serve as effective governance mechanisms for firm self-regulation in the global economy – 
improvement of environmental performance and signaling superior environmental responsibility. 
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Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations for ISO 14001 Certified Facilitiesa 
 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Post-certification environmental 
performanceb 3.95 1.36 -       
2 Quality of implementation 5.47 .86 -.14 0.81      
3 Pre-certification environmental 
performance b 3.99 1.39 .94
** .03 -     
4 Facility Size b 2.53 .45 .13 -.05 .16 -    
5 Facility age c 6.02 1.82 .06 -.03 .04 .16 -   
6 Technological change in industry -.16 .93 -.04 .01 .03 .23 -.12 0.71  
7 County population density b 2.33 .58 -.20 .25* -.09 -.07 .01 -.06 - 
 
a  n = 72 
b  Log-transformed variables 
c  Square root transformation 
Cronbach Alphas are reported along the diagonal. 
*  p < 0.05   **  p < 0.01  
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Results of Regression Analysisa 
 Dependent Variable:  Post-
Certification Environmental 
Performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Independent Variable   
  Quality of implementation  .23***  
(.06) 
Control Variables   
























R2 .89 .91 
Adjusted R2 .88 .90 
R2 Change   .02 
F for R2 Change  14.03
*** 
 
a Values are unstandardized coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
b  Log-transformed variables 
c  Square root transformation 
†  p < .10     * p < .05      ** p < .01     *** p < .001   (all two-tailed tests) 
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 TABLE 3 









Improvement b  
Certified Facilities    












Non-certified Facilities    
Full Sample 72 - -0.59 
(0.28) 
Facilities matched with 
certified Top Implementers  
36 - -0.79 
(0.38) 
Facilities matched with 
certified Bottom 
Implementers  
36 - -0.37 
(0.29) 
 
a Mean values are given. Standard errors are in parentheses 
b Positive values indicate improvements in environmental performance 
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Environmental Performance Improvements of Certified Facilities and their Matched Non-
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Independent Sample t-Tests of Mean Differences in Environmental Performance 
Improvements between Certified and Non-Certified Facilities 
 
 



































     
a one-tailed tests 
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Logarithm of average total annual chemical releases for facility for the three-year 
period directly following the year of initial ISO certification (reverse-scored). 




Post-certification reduction in TRI emissions in percent calculated as: (3-year 
average total annual TRI chemical releases before certification)-( 3-year 
average total annual TRI chemical releases after certification)/( 3-year 
average total annual TRI chemical releases before certification) 
For calculating this variable for each non-certified facility in the matched sample 
the same calendar years were used as for the corresponding certified facility.  





Survey Items: (rated on 7-point Likert scale) 
This question pertains to the implementation and perceptions of the ISO 
14001 EMS at your facility. To what extent:  
1)  are the documents created for the purpose of ISO 14001 used in daily practice? 
2)  has the ISO 14001 system become part of your regular routine? 
3)  are preparations for external audits made at the last minute? (reverse-scored) 
4)  is the system regularly ignored? (reverse-scored) 





Logarithm of average total annual chemical releases for facility over a period of 
three years directly preceding the year of initial ISO certification (reverse scored). 
Data Source: TRI database 
Technological 
change in industry 
 
Survey Items: (rated on 7-point Likert scale) 
How would you rate your main product in terms of percent of sales along the 
following characteristics? 
1)  Slow changing technology…Fast changing technology 
2)  Mature process technology…Evolving process technology 
Facility size 
 
Logarithm of the number of employees in the facility.  
Survey question:  
Approximately, how many employees does your facility have? 
(Triangulated with data from Dunn and Bradstreet database) 
County population 
density 
Logarithm of the number of county inhabitants per mile (2000) county in 
which facility is located. 
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau’s Database 
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